Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Egypt (September 1-2, 2026) marked a shift in Beijing’s engagement with West Asia. In talks with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, Mr. Xi set out a four-point formula for a new regional security architecture. Beijing has long talked about the need to rethink regional security, but this is the first time it has elaborated what such an architecture should look like.

Among the four points, the first is the need to “unleash the internal momentum of regional common security”. The core component of this is to reduce the “interference by external forces” while supporting regional countries to strengthen dialogue on peace and security. Second, Mr. Xi called for the issues in the region to be discussed comprehensively, while prioritising the goal of a two-state solution for the Palestinian question. Third, he stressed that “lasting stability and security in West Asia relies fundamentally on development”. In doing so, he articulated Beijing’s opposition to the weaponisation of international waterways, while positioning economic diplomacy and development cooperation as the preferred instrument for Chinese engagement. Finally, Mr. Xi insisted that all these efforts must happen through the United Nations framework.

A shifting security order

The announcement comes at an interesting moment in the evolution of West Asian geopolitics. The United States-Israeli war against Iran, the fracturing of Gulf security assumptions, disrupted energy flows and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and rising Türkiye-Israel tensions have all pressed on Chinese interests. Pakistan’s brokering of a U.S.-Iran understanding, which Beijing supported, offered a template for extending influence without exposure. Then came the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement on August 7, 2026 between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye.

In theory, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-style mutual defence agreement would not be welcome in Beijing. Over the years, the Chinese leadership has repeatedly pushed back against what it says is Cold War mentality and bloc politics. But in this case, it has been extremely cautious. There has been no formal comment, no direct leadership statement, and no word from its ambassadors. That, however, does not mean that there has not been an internal debate.

Mecca pact, Chinese views

For instance, Long Chen of Renmin University’s Chongyang Institute has argued that the Mecca pact might actually serve American purposes. Every administration since (then) U.S. President Barack Obama has sought to shed direct security costs, the 2025 National Security Strategy says as much explicitly, and regional states arming themselves is precisely what offshore balancing requires. He noted that all three signatories remain dependent on American weapons and intelligence. Of course, what all of this ignores is the difficult security relationship that Mecca pact members have with Israel, a key American ally in the region.

Others such as Zhou Li, a former Vice-Minister of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has argued that the pact is an exercise of regional strategic autonomy, produced by the erosion of American hegemony, and consonant with China’s Global Security Initiative. Mr. Zhou has contended that comparing this agreement to a NATO-style treaty is foolhardy, as there is no published text, no joint command, no cost-sharing, and no binding obligation.

Essentially, Mr. Zhou concludes that such a pact dilutes American primacy without creating a rival bloc that Beijing would have to position itself against. Mr. Zhou also suggested that the next member to join the agreement could be Egypt, which is where Mr. Xi’s statement and the choice of venue for it are significant. In calling to “unleash the internal momentum of regional common security”, Mr. Xi seems to have weighed in on the domestic debate, leaning in favour of Mr. Zhou’s argument.

What likely prompted him to do so is the belief that while Washington remains the preponderant military power in the region, its ability to defend allies against Iranian strikes, to enforce its will in the Strait, and to sustain commitment as its dependence on Gulf energy declines are all now open questions. Gulf states are, therefore, hedging, buying insurance from Pakistan and others. In other words, the American credibility problem has become an opportunity too juicy to miss out on. This is a moment during which Beijing can throw cautious support behind attempts among regional actors to pursue autonomy, with little practical cost to itself.

Beijing’s interests

China has significant economic and energy stakes in West Asia. If regional states are building their own architecture, Beijing can support the process economically and remain militarily disengaged. It already has substantial defence and technology trade with Pakistan, growing ties with Saudi Arabia, and openings in Türkiye and Egypt. Saudi Arabia and Egypt together absorbed roughly a third of China’s combat drone deliveries in the decade to 2023, according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data. Riyadh has also built domestic solid-fuelled ballistic missile capacity with Chinese technical assistance and is increasingly attracting Chinese technology investment. So there could be money to be made and influence to be cemented in terms of defence and technological engagement.

In essence, the formula announced by Mr. Xi in Cairo is a significant position being articulated with regard to the emerging security framework in West Asia. Whether this framework will demand certain guarantees that China remains reluctant to offer is something that must be noted going forward. More interestingly, it seems that despite all the friction, Beijing and Washington might be able to find some common ground in West Asia.

Manoj Kewalramani is Chairperson, Geostrategy Programme, Takshashila Institution